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Abstract: 
Universal norms, such as the requirement to work for self-support, are applied equally to rich and
poor.  Selective norms, such as the stigma attached to lone parenthood, seem to be imposed more
heavily on those with lower incomes.  Society sets a level of income at which a person is “too
poor” to be accepted as a single parent because the baby cannot be supported adequately; the
parent requires welfare assistance, which is costly to taxpayers, who respond by applying stigma. 
The income level below which stigma may be applied is endogenous, being effected by the
generosity of welfare policy and the cohesiveness of the community.  The paper shows that this
endogeneity of a non-universal norm considerably muddies comparative statics found elsewhere in
the literature.  For example: A community that becomes more cohesive is better able to enforce a
given norm, but it will also soften the norm so as to reduce enforcement costs.  The net effect on
behavior (a softer norm more strongly enforced) is ambiguous.  Another implication of the model
is that communities with higher incomes tend to be more permissive.  This is consistent with the
observation that over time, with economic growth, social control of the poor has grown weaker in
most developed societies.1
I. Fixed norms vs. endogenous norms 
Recently decision makers in the area of welfare policy have become interested in ways to
enlist the community in efforts to change behavior that can lead to poverty.  Attention has focused
on social norms in favor of work, family, and education, and against crime and substance abuse.
1 
Some of these norms are universal: virtually everyone in society is expected to work or be
involved in some other activity like schooling.  A life of crime or welfare receipt is considered
acceptable for no one. 
Other norms are selective, however, and there are open debates about which groups
should be subjected to the norm and which should not.  Some think no one should be a single
parent; others think single parenthood is acceptable for those who have the economic means to
raise the child.  By reverse implication, this means that virtually everyone thinks there are some
people who are too poor to raise a child on their own.  Thus if stigma is attached to lone
parenthood at all, it probably falls more heavily on the poor than the rich, although just how poor
a lone parent has to be before being stigmatized will depend on the community in which she lives. 
Her community may set a soft norm, saying that only those with a very low income are ‘too poor’
to be lone parents.  Or it may set a harsh norm, requiring a fairly high income before lone
parenthood is acceptable.  In any case the position of the norm in the income distribution is
endogenous, affected by the community’s power to enforce its norms (however defined) and by
the welfare system’s policy with respect to poor single parents.  
This paper develops a model in which the norm is endogenously selective as described
above.  This is a new approach to norms and their relationship to public policy.  Previous work
has only dealt with norms that are universal (Akerlof, 1980; Lindbeck, 1995; Lindbeck, Nyberg,2
and Weibull, 1997) or that are selectively applied to the poor but not endogenously.
2  Such
models identify a fixed group of people called ‘the poor’ and applies the norm to all of them
equally (Besley and Coate, 1992; Montgomery, 1994; Nechyba, 1996).
3  In models with this
structure there are fairly intuitive comparative statics between norms and policy.  When policy
rewards ‘bad’ behavior, more people violate the norms against it.  More cohesive communities
impose more stigma and are better able to control ‘bad’ behavior.  Similar results are found in this
paper’s model when norms are fixed.  
However, the paper goes on to show that if the norm is allowed to move in response to
the interests of the citizens, it will tend to move in a way that confounds the usual comparative
statics.  If a community becomes more cohesive, for example, the usual comparative static would
indicate that the norm is more powerfully enforced and the stigmatized behavior is reduced.  If the
definition of the norm is endogenous, however, the enhanced community cohesion will cause that
definition to soften.  The reason is that interdependence cuts both ways.  In a more cohesive
community, everyone is more interdependent and the act of ostracizing an individual is more
painful for the group.  Thus, although it is true that the community now has more power over the
individual, it is also true that loss of an individual is now more costly for the group.  With
increased power, the community can better enforce its norms.  With enforcement being more
costly, the community will want to reduce the amount of enforcing it has to do.  Thus the more
cohesive community will generally choose to enforce softer norms with greater diligence. 
Unfortunately, the net effect on behavior is unclear: a softer norm encourages bad behavior, but
the greater diligence discourages it.  Thus the main result of the paper is a caveat to the preceding
literature: if social notions of right and wrong can be changed by policy, there will no longer be a3
clear theoretical connection between policy and behavioral outcomes.  Or, if a real-world policy
has the intuitive effect, it will be weaker than expected because of the norm shift.  
While this is a negative result, the endogenous selectivity of norms also produces more
positive results.  By explicitly modeling the position of the norm, we can relate the permissiveness
of society to underlying conditions.  So, for example, the model shows that richer societies are
more permissive; greater wealth lessens the marginal utility consequences of tax effects, making
the benefits of enforcing norms comparatively weaker compared to the costs.  
The results are obtained using evolutionary dynamics to determine the likelihood that
norms will be enforced.  It then examines the response of behavior in equilibria where norms are
enforced and where they are not, as well as the impact of public policy on the likelihood of the
various equilibria.
4  The paper also explores the distributional consequences of norm enforcement,
showing that the poor and the non-poor may jointly prefer a norm-free society.
The paper is organized in six sections.  Section II sets up the basic model and derives
conditions for permissive and punitive equilibria.  Section III presents simple comparative statics
with respect to the frequency of lone parenthood.  Section IV considers the consequences of more
complex policy changes.  Section V explores some extensions of the basic model.  Section VI
examines distribution issues and economic growth.  Section VII concludes.4
II. A model of endogenous selective norms
The model will be presented in three sections.  The first section defines the choice
environment and the policy environment.  The second section holds the social norm fixed and
derives conditions for punitive and permissive equilibria (respectively, equilibria in which the norm
is enforced or ignored).  The third section lets the norm be endogenous.
A. Structure of choices and policy tools
Society consists of M people, indexed i = 1, ..., M, M large and odd.  Each agent is
endowed with an exogenous income yi, distributed uniformly on [0, y ¯].  Income provides utility
according to the function u(y), with u' > 0, u" < 0.  The government sets a poverty line, A; agents
with incomes below A are the poor and all others are the non-poor.  The poverty rate is B = A/y ¯
and the number of poor people is BM.  The number of non-poor people is (1-B)M.
Poor agents may choose to be a lone parent (choose Fi = 1) or not (Fi = 0) at a cost c.
5 
Lone parenthood increases utility for some more than others; let the utility increment of lone
parenthood for poor agent i be si, distributed uniformly and independently of income on [0, s ¯].
6  
Only those poor agents who become lone parents are supported by the welfare system;
they receive a grant g.  This policy structure is common in the U.S., which has traditionally
offered much more assistance to poor single parents than to other poor families.  The now-
defunct Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, most of whose principles are
being maintained by the states, offered assistance only to single parents until relatively recently. 
Studies of AFDC recipients show that grants are not so generous that it is possible to make
money by having children (Edin and Jencks, 1992), so c > g.
7  5
There is a selective norm N 0 [0, A] such that agents with incomes below N who choose F
= 1 open themselves to being sanctioned by other agents.  The idea is that those with very low
incomes are doing something “wrong” to have children whom they will have difficulty supporting. 
For the moment, consider N exogenous.  The norm is enforced when agents interact with one
another; specifically, each agent interacts with N other agents chosen at random from the
population.  Thus the probability that an interaction will be with a poor agent is B, with a non-
poor agent (1-B).  (For now assume that poor and non-poor agents face the same probabilities;
this will be relaxed in Section V.)  
All non-poor agents adopt one of two strategies when encountering others: to punish
violations (choose pi = 1) or not to do so (pi = 0).  An agent who chooses the punishment strategy
will impose a punishment on poor agents who have violated the social norm (i.e. lone parenthood
yet income below N).  A punishing agent will also punish other non-poor agents who have not
adopted the punishment strategy themselves.  (The norm cannot be enforced unless enforcement
is also enforced; see Sethi and Somanathan, 1996, p. 774).  A punishment imposes a cost * on the
victim and another cost 2 on the punisher.  These costs may be material (not offering a job or a
loan), social (staring, scolding, or ignoring), or emotional (cognitive dissonance, shame, guilt). 
Presumably 2 < * though it is not necessary for any of the results.  Let the rate of punishment be
b, defined as the number of non-poor agents who adopt the punishment strategy as a fraction of
the non-poor population (1-B)M.  
Define the severely poor as those with incomes below N; define the mildly poor as those
with incomes between N and A.  The severe poverty rate is z = N/y ¯, the mild poverty rate is x =
(A-N)/y ¯; B = z + x.  The violation rate v is the rate of lone parenthood among the severely poor;6
the toleration rate q is the rate of lone parenthood among the mildly poor.  The overall rate of
lone parenthood is l = vz + qx; this is the variable whose movements are of greatest interest.
Lone parenthood among the poor affects the well-being of the non-poor in two ways. 
First, the non-poor pay a lump-sum tax, t, to cover the costs of welfare.  Using the above
definitions, the total number of poor lone parents is lM; the total tax burden is therefore lMg and
the tax burden per non-poor agent is t = lg/(1-B).  Second, non-poor agents are altruistic and bear
a disutility " for each poor lone parent.  The public “bad” of poverty lone parenthood thus
reduces each non-poor agent’s utility by "lM.  (The assumption that altruism is the same for both
the severely and mildly poor will be relaxed in Section V.)  
For tractability, let the utility of the poor be linear: u(y) = (y.  Then the objective functions
of the various agents are:
Severely poor (y < N):  Vs(Fi; b) = ((yi-Fi(c-g)) + Fisi - Fib(1-B)N*
Mildly poor (N < y < A): Vm(Fi; b) = ((yi-Fi(c-g)) + Fisi
Non-poor (A < y): Vn(pi; b) = u(yi-lg/(1-B)) - pi(vz+(1-b)(1-B))N2
- (1-pi)b(1-B)N*  - "lM
For the severely poor, choosing lone parenthood causes punishment costs equal to the rate of
punishment (b) times the expected number of encounters with the non-poor ((1-B)N), times the
cost of each punishment, *.  The mildly poor are neither punished nor punishers.  The non-poor
who punish bear imposition costs 2 for the number of violators they encounter (vzN) as well as
the number of non-punishers ((1-b)(1-B)N).  Those who do not punish are punished themselves by
b(1-B)N others.  
In this environment the generosity of the welfare system is given by the size of the welfare7
grant, g, and the importance of community in daily life is given by the number of encounters, N. 
Both are considered to be policy parameters.  Other policy parameters that might bear interest
include * and 2, which determine the technology of imposing stigma, and A, which changes the
relative numbers of poor and non-poor citizens.  
B. Equilibria under a fixed social norm
An equilibrium has each poor agent choosing lone parenthood and each non-poor agent
choosing to punish if and only if that alternative offers the highest utility.  In addition the
aggregate decisions must produce an actual rate of punishment that is consistent with the rate that
makes those decisions optimal.  Evolutionary dynamics will be used to identify these equilibria. 
The particular mechanism to be employed is the replicator dynamics, in which each agent is
endowed with a strategy and then is more likely to produce an offspring (who also is endowed
with the strategy) as the utility provided by the strategy increases.  This biological description may
seem inappropriate for social science, but the replicator dynamics can also be produced by more
sociologically-motivated dynamics.  For example, they can be equivalent to a process in which
agents hold on to strategies until they seem to perform quite poorly, and then switch to some
randomly-chosen other agent’s strategy.  Or they can emerge if agents observe (even with noise)
the success of other agents’ strategies and then switch to those that seem to be doing best
(Weibull, 1995, pp. 152 - 161).  The specific form of the replicator dynamics states that if the
population share of some strategy s is x, and the payoff to the strategy is u(s,x), then the period
change in the population share is x 0 = (u(s,x) - u(x,x))x.  Strategies proliferate (or not) to the





¯ s & ((c&g) & b(1&B)N* dy (1)
Vn(pi;b) ’ u(yi & g
1&B
[A(¯ s&((c&g)) & Nb(1&B)N*])
& pi[¯ y(¯ s&((c&g)&b(1&B)N*)z % (1&b)(1&B)]N2
& (1&pi)b(1&B)N*
& "[A(¯ s&((c&g)) & Nb(1&B)N*]
(2)
0 b ’ 6&(1&b)[N(¯ s&((c&g)&b(1&B)N*)%(1&b)(1&B)]N2
% (1&b)b(1&B)N*>b
(3)
dynamics here is the objective function of non-poor agents, which is in turn a function of the
choices of the poor agents.  A severely poor agent will choose lone parenthood if and only if si >
((c-g) + b(1-B)N*.  Therefore the violation rate is 
Normalizing the population (M = 1), v = y ¯(s ¯-((c-g)-b(1-B)N*).  Similarly, mildly poor agents will
choose lone parenthood if and only if si > ((c-g), and the toleration rate is q = y ¯(s ¯-((c-g)).  The
overall lone parenthood rate is l = vz+qx = A(s ¯-((c-g)) - Nb(1-B)N*.  With these formulas the
objective function of non-poor agents is:
The replicator dynamics indicate that the change in the punishment strategy is b 0 = (Vn(1;
b) - Vn(b; b))b.  This reduces to (recall z = N/y ¯):
The parameters measuring tax burdens and altruism effects drop out; as pure public goods, they
have no influence on the optimality of punishment strategies.  The stationary states of the system9
b ( ’ N(¯ s&((c&g))%(1&B)
(1&B)(1%(2&1%NN)*)
(4)
(b 0=0) include b=1 and b=0; these will be called the punitive and permissive equilibria,
respectively.  A third stationary state is
At values of b greater than b
*, b 0 > 0; at values less than b
*, b 0 < 0.  Hence the extreme states b=0
and b=1 are stable while b=b
* is not.  Exogenous changes that raise b
* make the “basin of
attraction” of the permissive equilibrium larger; they can be interpreted as changes which increase
the likelihood of the permissive equilibrium.
8  Examination of b
* shows that the probability of the
permissive state increases with increases in welfare grants (g) and punishment costs (2).  The
probability of the punitive state rises with increases in community size (N), the norm (N), the cost
of violation (*), and the costs of having children (c).  The effect of the poverty line (A, which
determines B) cannot be signed.    
In the permissive equilibrium there is no sanction against lone parenthood, which reaches
its maximum at l
max = A(s ¯-((c-g)).  Lone parenthood reaches its minimum in the punitive state,
when it is sanctioned by all non-poor agents: l
min = A(s ¯-((c-g)) - N(1-B)N*.  In words, all A poor
agents with parenthood utilities si between ((c-g) and the upper bound s ¯ would be lone parents in
the absence of sanctions.  With sanctions, the N severely poor agents will be lone parents only if
their parenthood utilities lie between ((c-g) + (1-B)N* and the upper bound s ¯.  The utility hurdle
is raised by the amount (1-B)N*: the punishment * multiplied by the expected number of non-poor
agents encountered in the community (1-B)N.  
In principle the sanctioning system could reduce all violations to zero, if s ¯-((c-g) < N(1-10
B)N*.  This seems unrealistic, however, since there are few norms that enjoy universal adherence,
even in punitive societies.  Therefore assume that violations are positive even in the punitive
equilibrium: s ¯-((c-g) > N(1-B)N*.  
C. An endogenous norm 
As discussed in the introduction, selective norms are often heavily debated and their
precise definition is more likely to be endogenous than fixed.  The modeling issue is how to
endogenize the norm: if the norm moves, why does it do so?  As a starting point it is best to
recognize that the position of the norm has consequences for individual well-being.  Each agent
has a utility-maximizing norm that she would impose if given the power.  An agent’s ideal norm
moves in accord with changes in her economic situation.  A policy which raises her tax burden
would perhaps lower her ideal norm, making her someone who wants to subject more people to
stigma against lone parenthood.  
Changes in individual ideal norms should then affect the position of the actual, effective
social norm.  The mechanism by which individual ideal norms would aggregate to a defined social
norm is not obvious, however.  The social norm is effectively a coordination problem: given that
everyone else is enforcing the social norm at definition X, each individual non-poor agent should
do so as well.  The reason is simple.  Enforcing only his own ideal norm makes no sense: his
actions will not induce anyone else to enforce his ideal norm, and therefore his punishments will
not have the aggregate effect on the behavior of the poor that his ideal norm would have imposed. 
The agent’s choice is only to enforce the norm X or not.  If he does not, he is punished by all the
other agents without any corresponding benefit.  Therefore, in the punitive equilibrium any X can11
be supported as the equilibrium norm.  How then does society choose X from among the infinite
number of norm definitions that are possible?  
Solutions to coordination problems such as this tend to use the idea of the focal point. 
History, or a leader, can induce coordination on a particular outcome.  In the context of these
social norms, coordination is the outcome of the ongoing social debate about right and wrong. 
The existence of this debate, and the position of its participants, offer a hint as to how the norm
coordination modeling problem should be solved.  Those who debate social rights and wrongs are
in competition with one another, to sell newspapers, to gain votes, and to fill pews.  Simplifying,
one could imagine an outcome in which one of these debaters wins the competition.  Then all the
agents in society conclude that debater’s norm will be the effective social norm.  In effect, the
debate produces a winner, and the winner’s norm becomes the focal point of the norm
coordination problem.  To predict the position of society’s norm, it is only necessary to predict
who will win society’s moral debates.  Usually, victory goes to debaters with more middle-of-the-
road positions; fringe groups make more noise but are typically smaller, with lower circulation
and attendance, and fewer votes.  It follows that the social norm will settle somewhere in the
middle of the distribution of ideal norms.
Putting this idea into practice, let the social norm be defined as the median of the ideal
norm distribution.
9  In permissive equilibria all agents like all norms equally well, since they are
only empty words.  In punitive equilibria norms have real consequences, however.  For the poor,
these consequences are always negative, since the only effect of the norm on the poor is potential
or actual social punishment; for them the ideal norm is zero: no one is “too poor” to be a lone
parent.
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rate is small the median norm will be that of a non-poor agent.  (Alternatively one could simply
assume that the poor do not vote and have no power over the setting of the norm.)  In either case
the median ideal norm is found by optimizing non-poor utility with respect to N.  In the punitive
equilibrium non-poor agent utility is given by Equation (2) setting b and pi to 1.  Maximizing with
respect to N yields the first-order condition:
The first term is a tax effect: raising the norm puts more of the poor under sanction and reduces
lone parenthood, thereby reducing the tax burden of welfare.  The second term is an enforcement
effect: raising the norm raises the number of punishments which must be meted out, at a cost 2 for
each.  The third term is an altruism effect: raising the norm reduces the number of under-
nourished poor children, thus reducing a public bad.  The ideal norm balances the benefits of
reducing taxes and the number of poor kids against the costs of enforcing norms.
11  It is bounded
at 0 and A: lowering the norm below zero and raising it above A has no effect on the number of
poor drawn under the threat of sanctions (already none or all respectively), therefore it can have
no effect on non-poor utility.
12
The norm appears linearly in u(yi,N), hence the second-order condition is negative and (5)
produces a unique maximum for each agent, denoted Ni
*.  For any parameter x, sign(Fx) =
sign(MNi
*/Mx).  Because of the conflicting interests of the non-poor, however, the derivative of (5)
with respect of most of the parameters of interest cannot be signed.  For example, Fg gives the
response of norms to increases in welfare grants:13
Fg ’ (gu ))Mu
Mg
%u ))N* & N2( (6)
where primes indicate income derivatives.
13  With Mu/Mg < 0, the first term is positive: raising
grants raises welfare costs and hence tax burdens, which generates a demand in the populace for a
harsher, higher norm.  The second term is negative: raising grants encourages more lone
parenthood, which raises the number of norm violations, which makes enforcing a given norm
more expensive, which generates a demand in the populace for a softer, lower norm.  Perhaps
intuition sides with the second term; perhaps the usual effect of making welfare more generous is
to make norms harder to enforce, causing the non-welfare population to “burn out” and move in
the direction of tolerance.  The story will be true if the costs of punishing (2) are sufficiently
higher than the costs of being punished (*), or if the tax burden of welfare or the income
derivatives are small.  On the other hand, perhaps one might think that the costs of punishing are
trivial, in which case only the first term matters.  A priori it is not clear which effect will be more
important.
One can tell similar stories for several other parameters of interest.  Specifically, the
response of ideal norms cannot be signed with respect to community size (N), the poverty line
(A), the cost of violations (*), or the cost of having children (c).  On the other hand, the ideal
norm rises with increases in the degree of altruism in the non-poor population ("); it falls with
increases in the cost of imposing punishment (2), and with income (y).  Perhaps the altruism result
is counter-intuitive, in that altruists desire tougher norms; yet if altruists are concerned about the
number of children without adequate material support, it is understandable that they would prefer
norms that reduce this number.  Lastly it is worth noting that richer agents prefer softer norms, a14
result generated by the model’s assumption that the utility impact of tax burdens falls with income
while the utility impact of punishment remains constant.  It follows that richer societies (with their
richer median agents) choose softer norms.  As this outcome seems consistent both with the past
experience of wealthy countries and with comparisons across countries with different levels of
wealth, the assumption behind it seems to be sensible.
III. Comparative statics with respect to behavior
The model can be used to find the impact of policy on the rate of lone parenthood, taking
into account the fact that society’s enforcement efforts may help or hinder the intended policy
effects.  The norm enforcement system only exists in the punitive equilibrium, so attention will be
focused there.  Enforcement actions become important in two ways: in the response of norm
enforcement under a fixed norm, and in the response of the norm itself.  
A. Fixed norms
The lone parenthood rate is l = vz+qx = A(s ¯-((c-g)) - N(1-B)N*.  With N exogenous, the
comparative statics are simple: lone parenthood rises with increases in welfare grants and the
poverty line, and falls with increases in community size, the costs of violation, and the costs of
having children.  Each result matches intuition.  Especially, the idea that enhancing the
cohesiveness of the community (by raising N or *) can reduce lone parenthood; cutting welfare is
not the only means available.
B. Endogenous norms15
When norms respond to policy changes, however, these straightforward predictions are no
longer valid.  Raising welfare grants, for example, may or may not increase lone parenthood: Ml/Mg
= A( - (1-B)N*(MN/Mg); the second term cannot be signed.  If one suspects that norms soften when
grants are increased, then MN/Mg < 0 and the total effect is positive.  If norms get tougher when
grants increase (as when enforcement costs 2 are trivial), then MN/Mg > 0 and the expression still
cannot be signed.  Thus one cannot in general predict that raising grant amounts will lead to lone
parenthood, or vice versa.  The norm system may resist the immediate financial incentive
produced by the policy.
The same result holds for communitarian policies: Ml/MN = -(1-B)*(N+N(MN/MN)).  Raising
the number of community interactions has the direct effect of enforcing the norm more
powerfully, lowering the lone parenthood rate (-(1-B)*N).  Yet enforcing the norm is expensive;
the populace may desire a softer, less expensive norm and MN/MN may be negative.  In that case
the stronger community may become a more tolerant community, and it may become so much
more tolerant that lone parenthood rises.  Ambiguous predictions also hold for the poverty line,
the cost of violation, and the costs of having children.  Indeed only one effect can be signed.  The
cost of punishing (2) has no direct effect on lone parenthood, but it has an unambiguously
negative effect on the norm.  Thus increases in punishing costs lower the norm, which
unambiguously raises lone parenthood.  16
C. The permissive equilibrium
Finally, note that in the permissive equilibrium the lone parenthood rate is A(s ¯-((c-g)). 
With no community effects, the only way to reduce lone parenthood is to cut welfare or the
poverty line, or to raise the costs of having children.
D. Summary of results
Overall, the comparative statics show that one can predict with some accuracy how policy
changes affect the probability of transitions from punitive to permissive equilibria, and within the
punitive equilibrium how they affect lone parenthood if norms remain constant.  If norms are
endogenous, however, there are virtually no clear predictions.  The ambiguity arises from the
conflicting interests of non-poor voters in the harshness of the norm: harsh norms work well but
are expensive to enforce.  Table 1 summarizes the predictions.
IV. Practical policy reforms
A. Workfare
Workfare programs leave welfare grants at about the same level but require their
recipients to work.  This effectively reduces the utility value of the welfare grant to the recipient,
so it acts like a cut in the grant amount.  At the same time, however, workfare may be perceived
by recipients as a form of norm enforcement, a punishment for failing to be self-supporting. 
Indeed workfare is generally not imposed on those who are also often deemed to be the
“deserving” poor: the elderly, and mothers of infant children.  Moreover, workfare may produce
something of value to the community.  For both reasons workfare relieves the non-poor of some17
of the burden of enforcing norms, both because the government does some of the norm-enforcing
itself, and also because the way the government enforces norms produces public goods instead of
public bads.  Putting this in the context of the model, workfare acts as a cut in welfare (g)
accompanied by a reduction in the non-poor’s cost of norm enforcement (2).  
From Table 1 one can infer that such a policy is more likely than welfare cuts alone to
reduce lone parenthood.  Both aspects of the policy encourage the punitive equilibrium.  Within
the punitive equilibrium, the grant cuts reduce lone parenthood if norms are fixed.  When norms
are endogenous, the effect of grants cuts is unsigned but the effect of cheaper enforcement is not:
if government takes over some of the burden of norm enforcement, N rises, and norms become
tougher as more of the poor are taken into the sanctioning system.  The workfare approach helps
assure that norms do not erode in response to a policy change.  The more general lesson is that
when norms are endogenous, and there is some concern that a policy may soften them, it makes
sense to add a policy feature that can reduce the public’s enforcement costs.
B. Public child care
Table 1 indicates that public subsidies to child care (reductions in c) would increase the
probability of the permissive equilibrium and increase lone parenthood in the punitive equilibrium
if norm-shifting effects are small.  Some reform proposals involve a more extensive intervention,
however, that would place the children of severely poor parents in foster care or orphanages. 
While this lowers the cost of having children out of wedlock, it also changes the utility parents
receive from the children and removes the justification for welfare support.  In the model, this can
be interpreted as a reduction in c, a reduction in s ¯, and a reduction in g.  The reduction in s ¯ is18
motivated by the idea that removing children to foster care greatly reduces well-being for those
with great desire to have children, and has less effect on those whose desires are not as strong; the
distribution of s collapses.  The reduction in welfare grants occurs only for the parents; taxpayers
are still assumed to bear a burden in the amount g for raising the children in foster care.
In the model, the effect of this combination on lone parenthood would be complex.  Since
c > g, the net effect of removing both would be to encourage lone parenthood.  Yet the reduction
in s ¯ discourages it; whether lone parenthood rises or falls depends on the parameters, specifically
on the change in the term s ¯-((c-g).  Secondly, this term appears throughout the equations
regulating norm enforcement but its total impact is not clear.  Supposing for the moment that the
utility effect of having children removed is greater than the cash effect, assume that s ¯-((c-g) falls
as a result of the orphanage policy.  Then from (4) it can be seen that the probability of the
punitive equilibrium rises.  Unfortunately the impact on other aspects of the comparative statics
(for example, the effect of norm changes on non-poor agent utility) cannot be signed.  As with
simpler policies, the effect of an orphanage policy is theoretically ambiguous.19
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In the model, each agent encounters N other agents drawn at random from the population
at large, so that all agents, rich or poor, expect to meet (1-B)N non-poor agents and BN poor
agents.  Of course it is more likely that poor agents meet poor agents and less likely that they
meet rich agents.  To build this into the model, let the probability that a poor agent meets a non-
poor agent be 1-B’ < 1-B.  Also, let the probability that a non-poor agent meets another non-poor
agent be 1-B ˜ > 1-B.  This implies that although the lone parenthood rate among the severely poor
remains at z, the probability that non-poor agents will encounter severely poor lone parents is
some number z’ < z.  With these modifications the cut point between the punitive and permissive
basins of attraction becomes
Increases in social segregation of the poor from the non-poor imply decreases in 1-B’ and z’
coupled with an increase in 1-B ˜.  The overall effect cannot be signed; barriers between the poor
and the non-poor reduce the impact of punishment strategies (which decreases their attractiveness
to the non-poor) but it also makes them less expensive to adopt (which increases their
attractiveness).  If one downplays the second aspect by letting the cost of enforcement go to zero,
then segregation leads to a higher probability of the permissive equilibrium as the effect of raising
1-B ˜ in the denominator grows.  
This effect seems worth emphasizing.  In this model, interactions are exogenous; yet in the20
real world agents can have some effect (perhaps a considerable effect) on the type of interactions
they have.  If the poor are able to isolate themselves completely, they will of course never be
subject to the norms of the non-poor.  What this model shows is that the ability of the non-poor to
impose behavioral rules on the poor depends not only on the frequency with which the poor and
the non-poor cross the barriers between them, but also on the costs this imposes on the non-poor. 
A policy that tries to mix the poor and the non-poor may not change the poor’s behavior if the
costs of enforcing norms is high.  
B. Altruism only for the severely poor.  
The altruistic utility impact of lone parenthood in the model is the same whether the
parents are mildly or severely poor.  Alternatively one could apply altruism only to the severely
poor, making the altruism term in the punitive equilibrium "N(s ¯-((c-g)+(1-B)N*) instead of "(A(s ¯-
((c-g)) - N(1-B)N*); the altruism effect of the (A-N)(s ¯-((c-g)) mildly poor lone parents is
removed.  This has no effect on the probability of permissive or punitive equilibria, since altruism
remains a public good and does not change the attractiveness of the punishment strategy.  It also
has no effect on comparative statics of the punitive equilibrium with norms fixed.  It does,
however, affect the placement of the ideal norm.  Upward movements (that make the norm
harsher) increase non-poor utility because they reduce the overall rate of lone parenthood; this
positive utility impact is now lessened because some of the previously mildly poor agents are re-
classified as severely poor.  
Specifically, the altruism term in the first-order condition for the non-poor’s ideal norm
(Equation 5) changes from "(1-B)N* to "(1-B)N* - "(s ¯-((c-g)), a smaller number.  An21
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examination of both the fixed-norm and the endogenous norm results shows that this will have no
significant impact on the comparative statics, however.  In this model non-voter utility is linear in
altruism; a change in the altruism parameters effects a shift in the ideal norm but not in its reaction
to changes in other parameters.  Having altruism enter as a non-linear term might be an interesting
avenue of future research.
VI. Distribution and growth
A. Distributional consequences
Within the punitive equilibrium the distributional consequences of most of the policy
changes are clear.  Cutting grants reduces the well-being of poor lone parents and increases that
of the non-poor; the same is true for increases in the costs of violation (*) and for decreases in the
costs of punishing (2).  Increases in community interaction (N) hurt the poor (their only effect is
to increase the amount of sanctioning), but have an ambiguous effect on the well-being of the
non-poor (they reduce lone parenthood but make the punishment strategy more costly).  
The welfare consequences of a shift from a punitive to a permissive equilibrium are less
straightforward.  The severely poor gain F(1-B)N*, a release from the threat of sanctions.  The
mildly poor, not facing any sanction threat, are indifferent.  The welfare effects on the non-poor
can be expressed as follows:
where )V is the welfare change (permissive - punitive), and )u(x) is u(K) - u(K + x) for some
constant K; it is negative when x is positive.  The first term indicates the loss of in money-utility22
caused by the switch to the permissive equilibrium: as lone parenthood increases, the tax cost of
supporting low-income parents rises by gNN*.  The second term is an altruism loss, as the
increase in lone parenthood increases the number of unsupported children.  The third term is a
reduction in enforcement costs, since no one adopts punishment strategies.  Thus if the non-poor
bear only low costs of imposing punishments, one can characterize the poor and non-poor as
being at odds over which equilibrium is preferable.  Yet if enforcing social norms is expensive, the
poor and non-poor might share an interest in moving from a punitive to a permissive equilibrium.
B. Economic growth
One can characterize growth in the model by increasing the upper bound of the
distribution of income (y ¯), keeping the poverty line moving also so that the poverty rate stays the
same.  This raises the income of the median voter without changing the probabilities of poor and
non-poor agents interacting with one another.  In (4), it can be seen that the basins of attraction of
the different equilibria are not directly affected by income.  In equation (5), however, we have Fy
< 0, hence MN
*/My < 0.  Richer societies are less concerned about the tax burden of welfare; they
are more inclined to tolerate behavior that can lead to welfare receipt.  In a punitive equilibrium
this increases lone parenthood.  Moreover since the cut-point between the two equilibrium types
falls as N rises, increases in y lead to increases in the cut-point and therefore an increase in the
basin of attraction of the permissive equilibrium.  Therefore richer societies not only impose softer
norms on their poor, they are more likely not to impose any norms at all.  Thinking of this roughly
as a historical process, a gradual increase in income should lead to gradual increases in lone
parenthood as well as a gradual constriction in the basin of attraction of the punitive equilibrium. 23
At some point, following an exogenous shock of some kind, a ‘norm revolution’ occurs as the
society shifts from the punitive to the permissive equilibrium.  
VII. Conclusion
The first thing to be learned from the paper is that a selective norm tends to become softer
in response to changes which make it easier to enforce.  This makes it often unclear how behavior
will respond to changes in exogenous parameters.  The norm’s counter-acting response stems
from the fact that non-poor voters must balance the effectiveness of the norm at deterring
unwanted choices against the costs of its enforcement.  Only through empirical studies of norms
would it be possible to determine which of these two factors dominates in a given situation. 
Empirical projects have been frustrated, however, by the difficulty of quantifying norms.  While
there are some data sources that ask about values in general, data that acquire specific information
about how social rights and wrongs are defined are rare.  
The second thing to be learned is that the amount of social control imposed on the poor is
a fairly direct function of some of the exogenous parameters.  The model predicts, for example,
that norms should become softer (and are less likely to be enforced) as median income rises.  If
national-level values data can be interpreted as evidence of norms, one could conduct an empirical
cross-national study in which values data would be regressed on indicators such as national
income.  The model suggests the correlation should be negative in the sense that wealthier
countries hold more liberal values.  The model also predicts that, barring major changes in values,
countries where attitudes are harsher should see relatively greater responses of welfare caseloads
to changes in welfare generosity and standards of eligibility.  This prediction could be tested by24
regressing caseloads on interacted variables that combine values variables and policy variables.  
Overall, the paper can be viewed as a caution against the view that the way to solve social
ills is to enhance communities and put people in situations where they depend heavily on one
another.  The paper has shown that communities may respond in unexpected ways to community-
building efforts.  In particular, they may change their notions of right and wrong, and become
more forgiving of the behavior of their neighbors on whom they now rely more heavily for
support.  25






In the punitive equilibrium:
Effect of an increase in the variable




N Norm - defines level of
poverty below which it
is “wrong” to be a lone
parent
negative negative NA
g Welfare grants positive positive unknown
N Community interaction negative negative unknown
A Poverty line positive positive unknown
* Cost of violating the
norm
negative negative unknown
2 Cost of enforcing the
norm
positive none positive
c Cost of having children negative negative unknown26
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1. Proposals to restore the community in order to control behavior have been discussed in the
popular press (Peirce, 1996; Ehrenhalt, 1995), public policy (Aaron, Mann, and Taylor, 1993;
Kaus, 1992), political science (Putnam, 1995; Wilson, 1991), and law (Sunstein, 1996).  
2. Lindbeck’s (1995) norms are universal and endogenous.  He sketches informally the processes
by which the Welfare State might affect social expectations of behavior.  One might look at the
present paper as a formalization of some of these ideas.  Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull (1997)
also formalize the interaction of norms and welfare policy, albeit with a universal work norm
within a political economy equilibrium model.  The only endogenous element to the norm comes
from the ‘reflection’ effect: the more people adhere to the norm, the harder it is to violate.  The
group of people to whom the norm applies does not change (because it is universal), as it does in
this paper.  Another difference is that the reluctance to violate the norm is built into utility rather
than being supported by equilibrium strategies as it is here.
3.  There are many formal theories of norm enforcement, but comparatively few with policy
implications.  See Bernheim, 1994; Young, 1993; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Ghosh and Ray,
1996; Kandori, 1992; and Kandori, Mailath and Rob, 1993.  Less formal treatments include
Sugden, 1996; Hardin, 1990; and Boyd and Richerson, 1990. 
4. Simple methods of evolutionary selection have recently been used to examine the sustainability
of common pool resources (Sethi and Somanathan, 1996).  An earlier version of the model used
an enforcement mechanism based on repeated prisoner’s dilemmas, more in the spirit of Kandori
(1992) and Calvert (1991).  The enforcement equilibrium in that model produces the same
comparative statics as the stable enforcement state derived here with an evolutionary selection
method.  The earlier paper also reproduces the core result that no predictions are possible when
norms are endogenous.  The repeated-game model, however, has an infinite number of equilibria
with varying levels of enforcement; moreover it does not allow statements about the impact of
exogenous changes on the likelihood of the different enforcement equilibria.
5. It should be stated at the outset that the point here is not to build a realistic model of the
decisions that lead to lone parenthood (see An, Haveman, and Wolfe, 1993; Akerlof, Yellen, and
Katz, 1996).  The main objective of the paper is to examine the effect of norms and policies on
behavior that sometimes leads to poverty and welfare receipt when income is low.  Lone
parenthood is just a simple and concrete example of this kind of behavior.
6. Uniform distributions allow a clean expression of the comparative statics.  It is not clear how
the use of a more realistic normal or lognormal distribution would affect the results.
7. Policy parameters are taken be exogenous here rather than determined in a political-economic
equilibrium.  This is because the wider discussion which motivates this paper revolves around the
possibility that government policies can induce communities to enforce norms.  Implicit in this
discussion is the idea that the government is an exogenous actor.  
Endnotes31
8. What is meant here is that a random shock to the system (the introduction of a group of mutant
strategies) is less likely to result in a move from the permissive to the punitive equilibrium the
greater is b
*.  
9. As a social coordination problem, the selective norm is an aspect of culture as understood by an
emerging line of research in political science, anthropology, and sociology.  For more, see
Schelling (1960), Coleman (1990), Kreps (1990), Johnson (1991), Calvert (1992), Greif  (1994),
and Crawford and Ostrom (1995).  
10. Actually most poor agents are indifferent to movements in the norm; only the agent on the
margin between near and severe poverty cares, and she prefers the norm to be lower so that she
may be defined as mildly poor and removed from sanctions.
11. Here the ideal norm is derived entirely from individual interests.  One could allow for non-
utilitarian views about the norm by adding a random variable to the utilitarian ideal norm.  If the
random variable has a zero median (as it should if it is to be independent of the agent’s material
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12. Under constant relative risk aversion (u(y)=(1-g)
-1y
1-g), the ideal norm becomes
where ym is the income of the median agent.  Using this equation, conditions on 2 can be
established such that the ideal norm lies between 0 and A.  First note that N
* is positive in 2 and
the function is invertible, hence consider the inverted function 2(N).  A condition for 2(0) > 0 is
that the first two terms in the above are positive.  This reduces to 
but the right hand term is simply the tax burden, J.  Thus if welfare grants are sufficiently small,
the median voter’s income exceeds her tax burden.  In that case there exists a positive value of 2
that puts the norm at zero, resulting in no sanctions.  Because the ideal norm is positive in 2,
raising theta from this level generates a positive norm, resulting in sanctions against some of the
poor.  Raising 2 sufficiently high puts the ideal norm at the poverty line A, resulting in sanctions
against all of the poor.
13. As it stands this expression does not use the information in the first-order condition. 
However, taking the first-order condition into account does not change the ambiguity of the sign. 
It does make the expression more difficult to interpret in terms of tax effect and norm-
enforcement effect, so I have left it in this simpler form.  The same is true for the other
comparative statics: in all cases, substituting the first-order condition does not allow the resulting
expressions to be signed.